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Economic Aspiration and Method
Jesse W. Markham*

It would be highly appropriate on an occasion such as this to paint
in bold relief some undiscovered and heretofore unarticulated broad
sweep of economic change. I reluctantly discarded this topic for two
compelling reasons: it was too lengthy; and my ignorance in this area
turned out to be extraordinarily comprehensive. It also occurred to
me that a promising topic might be developed out of where this nation
seems to be going. What, for example, will be the visible coloration
and composition of its economic fabric in, say, the year 2183 when
Vanderbilt University celebrates its 300th anniversary? This topic
seemed safe. While the speaker would not be around to receive the
customary accolades for having been right, a sizeable portion of the
audience would not be around to remind him of having been wrong.
But then I recalled an old Danish proverb that in rough translation
goes something like this: "Predictions are hazardous, especially about
the futurel" To hold the hazards to a minimum, I shall therefore
confine myself to the past.
The topic I have chosen concerns the changing nature of organized
economic enterprise, especially its social and legal environment. By
organized economic enterprise I shall mean any economic entity in
which decision-making is essentially composite rather than individual,
of which business corporations and labor unions are the most obvious
and, in terms of impact on the total economy, the most important.
But by the criterion employed-decisions are essentially composite
rather than individual-the average household consisting of at least
one wife and husband surely falls within its ambit. Nor do I mean
to imply that organized economic enterprise can be assessed without
regard to the individual, qua individual. In truth, history seems to
establish a reciprocal relationship between the two. Samuel Gompers
was an individual, but it can fairly be said that from 1886 to 1924 he
was also the American Federation of Labor, as was John D. Rockefeller virtually synonymous with Standard Oil. Whatever else these
organizations may be in our contemporary economic society, they
clearly are a great deal more than George Meany and M. J. Rathbone,
their present presidents. It may not be entirely true, but it is certainly
not entirely false, that where once man made the organization the
organization now makes the man.
o Professor of Economics, Princeton University.
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It is not to be inferred from this that the modern American economy
no longer provides rewards and incentives for individuals. On the
contrary, our social institutions, including our economic institutions,
both foster and preserve individual choice. But the fact is that most of
what we identify as individual initiative and choice is expressed within
the confines of organized business. The individual worker of an earlier
era aspired to higher income through his union; the small-scale
business firm seeks progress through its trade association; the individual inventor of the nineteenth century has left his garret for the
corporate laboratory; even agriculture, long regarded as our last
stronghold of grassroots individualism, is either organized or so
regulated by government that organization is unnecessary.
I wish first, by drawing the appropriate contrasts, to show that the
conduct of organized enterprise has undergone dramatic change. I
have already referred to Samuel Gompers and John D. Rockefeller.
While historians are not likely to view them as comrades-in-arms
fighting a common cause, they sought a common economic goal for
the organizations they created which could be summed up in a
succinct, simple, and single word: "more." And if their tactics differed,
it was only because railroad rebates furthered the ends of an oil
empire, while the strike, boycott, and secession from the masses of
unskilled industrial workers served those of a confederation of strong,
powerful, trade unions. But both accepted the fundamentals of late
nineteenth century capitalism, were keenly aware of the rewards of
monopoly power, and responded instinctively to the simple and unencumbered maximizing principle on which neoclassical economics
had been created.
The chronicle of the economic excesses of organized enterprise in
this period, of which Standard Oil was only a part, is much too
complete and too familiar to be reviewed at length here. But it is
important to identify the standards by which the excesses of enterprise were measured. Classical and neoclassical economists had bequeathed to nineteenth century and early twentieth century America
the simple economic doctrine of competitive laissez-faire. It was a
doctrine of tremendous appeal for any society having historical reasons
for equating political power with arbitrary political power. The economic doctrine of laissez-faire was based on the "natural" law of the
market place. If left unencumbered by the political process-always
capable of serious error-the natural laws of the market place rewarded each according to his economic contribution to society. "From
each according to his ability, to each according to his ability" came
within one word of the Marxian doctrine, but the interchange of a
single word placed the two systems at opposite poles. In this context,
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to condemn excesses of enterprise was to condemn the system itself.
The natural laws of the market place did not specify the constraints on
enterprise, they simply rewarded it according to its ability to earn
the maximum return. Thus, if some corporations grew in power by
employing ruthless tactics against others, if the labor of women and
children could be bought cheaper than that of men, if companies
suppressed unions and unions suppressed companies, then that was
how enterprise was expressed and how the market rewarded it. The
possibility that business enterprise may govern the market instead of
being governed by it occurred to some, but as late as the 1920's
President Calvin Coolidge could announce as a national slogan that
"The Business of America is Business," and this was usually understood to mean unrestrained business guided by market forces.
All of this has undergone dramatic change. While I do not believe
that the business corporation or large labor union of the 1960's is on
the brink of being confused with our eleemosynary or charitable institutions, one need not be a mid-twentieth century Solomon to distinguish either from its early twentieth century predecessor. The modern
corporation customarily acknowledges in its annual report its responsibilities to the consuming public, its labor force, and its stockholders,
frequently in that order. If it has one, it advertises its excellent record
of research and development, labor relations, and plant safety. It
becomes self-conscious over rising unemployment, and in the national
interest of combating inflation it announces price increases apologetically. When the President intercedes with too much vigor, as in
the case of steel last year, it even rescinds them. Corporations give
millions of dollars annually to causes of higher education and various
charities, and it is to be emphasized that society defines this as
"corporate giving," as something not to be confused with the bequeathing of personal fortunes to colleges and universities characteristic of an earlier era.
Moreover, since the highly publicized Smith' decision was handed
down by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1953, such corporate
giving is left to the discretion of organized business management,
which means that the gift need not be directly associated with any
immediate and definable benefit to the corporation itself. In short,
du Pont's annual appropriation for higher education no longer must
contemplate "Better things for better Living through Chemistry," or
the possible establishment of the University of E. I. du Pont de
Nemours and Company, Inc. As one of my colleagues, John William
Ward, put it in his provocative article "Private Business and Private
1. A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed,
346 U.S. 861 (1953).
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Education,"2 the Smith decision defined the legitimacy of corporate
action so as to equate the benefit done society with the benefit done
the corporation. Former Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson's
famous statement, "What's good for General Motors is good for the
country," was not generally greeted with enthusiastic applause, but
his great error consisted of having stated the proposition in reverse
order.
It would seem then that organized enterprise has become a good
citizen. Corporate chicanery has given way to corporate charity, professionals have replaced privateersmen, empire has succumbed to
empathy; and differences between management and labor, once fought
with vicious strikes and lockouts, and settled by bloodshed and the
national guard, by comparison now take on all the semblances of a
spirited debate between Smith and Vassar on the explosive topic:
"Resolved that a 6.5 per cent wage increase, including fringe benefits,
is in the present national interest." The public has now grown accustomed to the emergence of the adversaries from the conference
room locked in affectionate embrace and announcing to the world a
new milestone in collective bargaining. Occasionally, of course,
organized enterprise reverts to the ways of its unruly past. In the
New York newspaper strike the unions displayed naked power. And
the bizarre 1960 Philadelphia affair involving the electrical equipment
manufacturers stands as a reminder that old fashioned conspiracy
may not yet be entirely dead-a reminder, expressed in quantitative
terms, that totaled about one billion dollars in fines and seven jail
sentences. But significantly, Judge Ganey sternly lectured the culprits
for sullying the good name of all corporate enterprise, and President
Kennedy reminded the newspaper unions that their recalcitrancy
showed a flagrant disregard for the public interest. These are obviously isolated exceptions to the generally practiced standard of good
behavior through enlightened self-interest.
These visible changes in the conduct of organized enterprise clearly
need explaining. Since a consensus prevails that the corporations and
unions are still essentially economic in character and in purpose, it is
appropriate to begin the search by testing the validity of some possible
economic explanations, the most obvious of which lies in the classical
doctrine itself. That is to say, if the earlier excesses of laissez-faire
capitalism were attributable to the power of enterprise to govern the
market, can their disappearance be attributed to strengthened market
forces now capable of governing enterprise? Has the invisible hand
of Adam Smith developed sufficient sinew to turn the motive of
2. Ward, Private Business and Private Education, 1958
209, 211.
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maximum private gain to public good?

If the forces of the market place have undergone any such dramatic
change in the past half-century, the evidence is not to be found in
the anatomy of the economy. In spite of all the frantic pronouncements that Big Business is taking over the American economy, and
cries from the other side that the forces of dynamic, competition are
growing stronger, the striking feature of the economy is the longrun
stability of its structural indexes. By far the most comprehensive
study of overall concentration in the economy concludes that the
relative importance of the largest 200 corporations was certainly no
greater, and was probably smaller, in 1947 than in 1900. Another
study shows that monopolistic industries accounted for a slightly
lower proportion of total economic activity in 1947 than in 1900, but
still another shows a probable slight increase in 1958 over 1947. Between 1900 and 1958 the change, if any, is insignificant. The number
of business firms for every 1000 population in 1900 and today are
within three-tenths of one percentage point of each other. Even the
corporate revolution which Professors Berle and Means described in
such awesome terms in 1932 was apparently arrested about midway
in its conversion of a nation of shopkeepers into a virtual corporate
society. In 1960 incorporated enterprises accounted for fifty-six per
cent of the nation's output of goods and services, almost exactly the
percentage they accounted for in 1929. Clearly, there is no persuasive
evidence that structural change accounts for the more temperate
behavior of organized enterprise. The constraining invisible hand of
a competitively structured economy apparently constrains no more nor
no less than it did a half-century ago.
But if the constraining forces of the market have not grown stronger,
by the same line of reasoning there is no presumption that they have
grown weaker, and hence other explanations for the great change in
the behavior of enterprise that rest on this assumption are also of
dubious validity. It is not my intention here to assess in depth the
numerous and various theories of what in fact constrains modern
organized enterprise. Some have long since been accorded the decent
academic funeral they so richly deserved; those that survive fall far
short of a consensus. I do intend to deal with one or two of the more
prominent theories, chiefly because they set the stage for what I
believe to be a new perspective of the issue.
3
Professor A. A. Berle addressed the matter in the following terms:
Modern corporate enterprise is at once the instrument which has
rendered obsolete all economic theory and has given the United
States a planned economy without government planning. The typical
3. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPrAIST REVOLUTION (1954).
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firm, argues Berle, has by virtue of its size and power been liberated
from the traditional constraints that the classical theory of competitive
enterprise imposes. This power is significantly understated by the
conventional statistical means. The economic power of General
Motors, for example, is not confined to its share of the automobile
market, currently estimated at fifty-three per cent, but is greatly
extended by its contractual arrangements with the multitude of small
firms that supply it with everything from transmission assemblies to
valve stems, and distribute its final product. These firms are merely
economic appendages of the seat of corporate power. What, then,
controls this power? From all visible manifestations such huge enterprises appear to be very much like the little lad who having partially
mastered the technique of his bicycle, passes in review before his
somewhat apprehensive parent shouting with pride, "Look, Ma, no
hands." The simile is not inappropriate to Berle's thesis. While traditional market forces do not govern the corporation, it has an audience to which it must be responsive. By virtue of its size and power it
resides in a veritable goldfish bowl. Any action it takes repugnant to
the public interest is critically exposed in the press. Hence, it cannot
exert the power it possesses to the fullest without public reprisal.
Moreover, there is always the threat of government action to punish
those sins press exposure may leave uncorrected. After all, in 1947
President Truman threatened to build steel plants to alleviate the
"gray" market in steel, and in 1952 for a short while actually seized the
industry and placed it under government management. To Berle the
institutions of publicity and threat of government action now supply
the controls the market once supplied, although he concedes that since
none of these large enterprises are without competitors, the market
still plays a modest role. But in Berle's theory the constraining forces
lie outside the enterprise, and largely outside the market in which
the enterprise functions.
There are also perfectly respectable theories pointing to the conclusions that the big change has come from within. Modem enterprise
still confronts the traditional market constraints, but it reacts to them
differently. The clearest and most rigorous of these theories has
recently been set forth by Professor W. J. Baumol, who suggests that
if conventional theory were to drop the assumption that the business
firm attempts to maximize its profits, and substitute in its place the
assumption that it attempts instead to maximize its market position,
after it has once attained some minimum profit goal, accepted theory
would then explain much business behavior now left unexplained.
At some point firm growth becomes more important than additional
immediate profits, if for no other reason than that the former assures
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survival with at least satisfactory profits. Firms once highly profitable
have been known to die, or at least suffer serious decline. Firms that
grow, by definition, avoid both.
To those of us concerned with the operative mechanics of highly
industrialized societies, Baumol's theory has powerful welfare and
public policy implications. As all college sophomores-and quite a few
freshman-know, the historical indictment of firms with market power
is that in exploiting it they also exploit the public by raising prices
and restricting output. Accordingly, if firms logically and predictably
substitute the goal of maximum output for that of maximum profit,
the historical grounds for condemning market power disappear; the
aggressiveness of enterprise operates in the public interest.
Like all thoughtful theories of responsible and thoughtful men,
those of Berle and Baumol have a degree of credibility. However, I
believe they both fall a good deal short of providing an explanatory
hypothesis for the striking change the behavior of organized enterprise has undergone. The number of independent newspapers reached
its peak around 1914. Many of them were house organs of political
parties and some were in business to crusade against business. There
is therefore little reason to suppose that they were less vigilant in
exposing the excesses of enterprise than their 1960 counterparts. And
as for growth as a goal, it would be difficult to find a period when
organized enterprise put growth above all else to a greater extent
than in the combination wave of 1887-1904. The reasons for the
change must lie elsewhere.
The significant proximate cause, I believe, lies not in the reshuffling
of the guiding incentives of enterprise or in the increased likelihood
of exposure in the press, but rather in the continuous trend toward
a substitution of public law for market forces. The excesses of laissezfaire capitalism at the turn of the century may have been many and
varied, but those most frequently mentioned by the critics of that
time were exploitation of unorganized labor (especially the labor of
women and children), the use of questionable if not downright
fraudulent means of finance, and the ruthless suppression of competing enterprises that blocked the road to unchallenged market
power. In much more general terms, the decisions of organized enterprise determined the level of employment and the distribution of
income. One by one all of these have been transferred from government by market forces to government by the statutory vehicles of
public policy.
The specific legislative means by which many of these earlier and,
in their time, legitimate excesses of a free market economy have been
assigned to government by public law are reasonably familiar to all.
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The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and its amendments of the 1930's
have made banking stable, above board, and honest. They have also
made the interest rate, once left to the market, an instrument of
national monetary policy. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
designed to enforce similar high standards in the corporate securities
market. Comprehensive labor laws establish rigorous standards of
employment, including the minimum wage. And the corporate income
tax requires that at least half the profits corporations earn be turned
over to the government for public purposes, a factor that surely is not
completely divorced from recent increases in corporate giving in
support of higher education.
While all of these developments have altered the behavior of
organized enterprise in significant ways, I believe that the most important factor has been the spectacular alteration in the Magna Carta
of the free enterprise system itself-the federal antitrust laws. The
excesses of organized enterprise in fact and in theory are generally
attributed to the high order of market power enterprise possesses. The
simple objective of antitrust policy is to prevent the attainment of
such power, and hence assure to society the benefits of a smoothly
functioning, productive, and competitive economy unencumbered by
the rigid regulations of the state. While opinions among the specialists
varied, most agreed that up to 1950 antitrust policy had not fulfilled
its appointed task with distinction.
Recent administrations may not have successfully eliminated those
seats of market power inherited from a previous era, but they have
clearly revitalized antitrust policy so as to prevent the enhancement of
such power in the future. Since 1950 more cases have been initiated
against business firms than in all the previous history of antitrust.
Price discrimination, once rampant, has been attacked on all sides.
Business mergers, the means by which economic empires were once
created, have now become a hazardous road to growth. In 1920 a
succession of mergers that brought together sixty-five per cent of the
nation's steel capacity passed muster under the then prevailing standards of antitrust policy. In 1960 the merger of a shoe manufacturer
and a shoe retailer accounting for a bare three and six-tenths per cent
of the nation's output of shoes was declared illegal. In fact, thoughtful students of antitrust policy long sympathetic to its purposes have
recently become concerned over the new and invigorated antitrust
laws. They have not only demonstrated an unprecedented capacity to
arrest tendencies toward monopoly, but they have also been bent to
serve the ends of small business legislation. In the drive to halt
activities by one firm that work to the disadvantage of others,
especially if the others are smaller, they seem also to be arresting
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tendencies toward competition. When organized enterprise can neither
monopolize nor compete, it obviously operates under a severe constraint.
It was once contended that the ghost of Senator Sherman, whose
name our parent antitrust statute bears, was an invisible member of
the Board of Directors of every large corporation in the United States.
He has now been joined by the late Senator Kefauver, Congressman
Celler, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and the four of them
can often muster a majority vote.
Nor are the legal constraints limited to the enacted statutes. There
are also the constraints imposed by the lawmakers-Congress and the
President-especially that recently developed instrument of control,
the congressional investigating committee. Judged from its postwar
schedule, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary can scarcely claim to
have had a really successful year without investigating the steel
industry, unless of course it has meanwhile been much too occupied
investigating automobiles, drugs, insurance, daily newspapers, television rating systems, and newsprint. These inquiries serve purposes
far beyond that of enhancing the wisdom of Congress-ostensibly
their original purpose. They also have the force of law without the
limits codification and judicial review impose. For example, there is
no law stating that the price of steel cannot be increased, and if
enacted its constitutionality would no doubt be hotly contested. But
at least two congressional inquiries into why steel prices should not
rise have been sufficient to assure that steel prices did not rise; and on
one highly publicized occasion when a steel price increase caught the
responsible committee too deeply involved with the drug industry to
notice, the President proved himself to be a highly effective substitute.
It is often said, frequently on the editorial page of newspapers, that
Congress cannot repeal the universal laws of supply and demand. My
central thesis is that while it may not have repealed them, it has
imposed significant legal constraints on their operation. Much economic activity these economic laws once governed is now governed by
the laws of Congress. The dramatic changes in the behavior of
organized enterprise are therefore not so much attributable to any
perceptible alteration in their basic economic incentives, but rather
to the mounting institutional constraints on how those incentives may
be exercised. Actions of business enterprise, once simply a normal and
spontaneous reaction to market forces, must now be carefully checked
with corporate counsel. Where once the market dictated, the law
now prescribes. We now have, or are rapidly approaching, a legalistic
economy.
Since the performances of a market economy have historically been
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so inextricably entwined with welfare economics, it would be appropriate to conclude with a few observations on whether the new
legalistic economy serves the public weal better or worse than its earlier
unfettered market counterpart. I expect that most would applaud the
change; and unless the democratic process has itself been defective,
the new economic order is by definition more consistent with the
public's economic and political preferences.
But this provides no reason for complacency that all is well in
Eden. I do not know when man first rose up on his hind legs and
moved forward in pursuit of his economic self-interest. But the fact
that he did provided society with a logical set of analytical economic
tools capable of predicting certain economic results if certain assumed
conditions were fulfilled. These formal analytical tools made economics the queen of the social sciences. They made it possible to
apply the principles of scientific method to a vital aspect of human
endeavor. Much more importantly, they provided nations-and especially this nation-with a simple system of political and economic
order that endured well into the twentieth century. It was simple
because it avoided most of the encumbrances of enacted law; it was
orderly because it related man to his economic environment in a predictable fashion.
The legalistic economy that has been substituted in its place is
neither simple nor, do I believe, orderly. It has developed not as
system but as a disjointed set of piecemeal correctives. In consequence, while having gradually ameliorated the excesses of a definable
economic system, it has unsystematically given rise to the equally large
problems born of incoherence and inconsistency. Under the legalistic
economy we have become the first acknowledged affluent society
deeply concerned with its rate of economic growth. We contradictorily by law raise the prices of goods in abundance but depress the
prices of goods in relatively short supply. Legal institutions have
recently prohibited a single vendor of potato chips from charging
slightly different prices to different customers in Cleveland, but they
enable a single union official to close down all the oceanic shipping
on the Atlantic seaboard. By one set of laws we permit domestic oil
producers to restrict their output and artificially to raise their prices to
conserve domestic oil reserves, but we at the same time restrict by
law the importation of oil from abroad. We are baffled by and unable
to explain the "new inflation" because the important variables of the
economy have lost the systematic relationship they once bore each
other. The list of inconsistencies could be greatly extended.
All this, I hope, will not be misinterpreted as advocacy for a return
to the nineteenth century, or even for the primacy of economic models
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over the rules of law. But the legalistic economy, as was true of the
market economy it replaced, has its excesses. There is, however, a
distinct difference between the two. The simple market system we
have laid aside not only explained but justified. The legalistic economy does neither. It defies clear articulation and is imprecisely described as a "mixed" economy.
This affords me the one occasion in this essay to say something
directly associated with its title. I refer to methodology. Economics,
even analytical economics, had its own day of incoherence and inconsistency. These deficiencies were exposed and corrected with the
development of the concept of general equilibrium, a formal system
of economic logic that owes much to the nineteenth century French
economist Leon Walras. In lay terms it simply proved that we could
not reason from the particular to the general without grievous error.
That is, a law that apparently benefits some farmers may not only
work to the net disadvantage of the entire economic community, it
may even work to the disadvantage of all farmers. I know far too
little about the law to urge that law schools seriously ponder this page
from the history of economic method, but it is at least a fitting occasion to call it to their attention.

